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AGENCY CONFLICT AND CULTURE: Federal

Implementation of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act by the National Indian
Gaming Commission, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and the Department of Justice
Kevin K. Washbumt
INTRODUCTION

The so-called "Founding Fathers," the men who came together to draft
the United States Constitution, believed in divided government and the
dispersion of governmental power among competing institutions. They
believed that a system of separation of powers and checks and balances
could prevent the aggregation of power in a single decision-maker who
might abuse that power. The Founding Fathers of the United States would
have been proud of the Congress that created the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act ("IGRA"). Aside from the Constitution, it is hard to imagine a federal
law that disperses power more widely and among more institutions across
more levels of government than IGRA. This article explores some of the
ramifications of dispersing power (and responsibility) among three separate
federal agencies that do not always cooperate. The result has been uneven,
and sometimes inconsistent.
While the Constitution explicitly distributes power among only two
sovereigns (states and the federal government), IGRA explicitly disperses
power among three (states, the federal government, and tribes). In some
provisions, the dispersion of power was a conscious decision by Congress.
For example, IGRA's compacting provisions sought to force state and tribal
governments to negotiate with one another about certain forms of gaming
and authorized the Secretary of the Interior ("Interior Secretary") to review
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the outcome of the negotiations.' These provisions spread power widely, so
as to prevent action in the absence of consensus.
Some of the later problems in the implementation of IGRA, on the other
hand, were inadvertent. They came about as a result of a lack of careful
thought in the drafting of the statute. One example is the provision in IGRA
that presumed to give tribes the power to sue states in federal courts for
failure to negotiate in good faith regarding Class III gaming. 2 The drafters
took a significant risk in attempting to authorize tribes to sue states in
federal court and making such an action a tribe's sole remedy for a state's
failure to negotiate in good faith. At the time, it was not at all clear that
Congress had the power to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit. Indeed, a major case presenting that very question, Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co.,' was being litigated before the Supreme Court during the

months that Congress was considering IGRA.4 The Court granted certiorari
for the second time in the Union Gas case approximately seven months
before IGRA was enacted.5 The Court fretted over Union Gas for most of
October Term 1988 ("OT 1988"), taking well over a year to decide the case
after certiorari was granted.
Ultimately, a sharply divided Court narrowly upheld Congressional
power to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in a decision issued
after IGRA had been signed into law.6 The decision in Union Gas produced
five separate opinions. A four-justice plurality favored Congressional power
to abrogate state immunity,7 joined only as to the result by a fifth justice
1. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (effective Oct. 17, 1988). However, the compact provisions
did not work out quite as Congress intended. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (finding portions of the compacting provisions unconstitutional).
2.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
3.
491 U.S. 1 (1989). In that case, a sharply divided Court narrowly upheld
Congressional power to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in a decision decided the
summer after IGRA had been signed into law. Though the drafters of IGRA may have breathed
a sigh of relief, the issue was not settled. The decision in Union Gas produced five separate
opinions. A four-justice plurality favored Congressional power to abrogate. The plurality was
joined by one other justice who agreed that Congress had the power, but disagreed with the
plurality as to the basis for that power, making the opinion roughly a 5-4 decision.
4.
See Order Granting Certiorari, Pennsylvannia v. Union Gas Co., 485 U.S. 958 (1988)
(No. 87-1241).
5.
Id. The petition for certiorari clearly raised the issue of Congressional power to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d. Cir. 1987), petition Jbr cert. filed, 1988 WL 1094054 (Jan. 21, 1988)
(No. 87-1241).
6.
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467, was signed into
law on October 17, 1988, but Union Gas was not argued until October 31, 1988 and not decided
until June 15, 1989. 491 U.S. 1.
7.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23.
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who disagreed with the plurality as to the basis of the asserted power.8
Thus, though the decision was 5-4 in favor of abrogation, this particular
majority was even more fragile than in an ordinary 5-4 decision. The case
left the Supreme Court deeply divided on the issue.
The drafters of IGRA must have breathed a sigh of relief when Union
Gas came out in favor of the power to abrogate. However, while the issue
may have been temporarily decided, it was not well settled as evidenced by
the numerous decisions in the case. The incredible risk that drafters had
taken materialized in 1996 when Seminole Tribe v. Florida was decided. 9
Seminole Tribe revisited and overruled Union Gas.'l It produced a solid
five-justice majority against congressional power to abrogate state
immunity, 1 leaving Indian tribes with no statutory remedy for a state's
failure to negotiate in good faith regarding Class III gaming.
On the issue of state immunity, the drafting of IGRA was apparently
intentional, but it was a risky choice. In other contexts, however, the law
scattered power among federal and state actors without adequate thought
about the ramifications of the distribution of power.
One of the unanticipated consequences of IGRA, for example, was
extensive litigation in state courts over constitutional issues of separation of
powers in state governments. Since tribal-state compacts were relatively
unusual before IGRA and such compacts rarely involved such high stakes,
the law in many states was not clear as to whether the authority to negotiate
and execute such compacts was executive or legislative in nature. In some
states, governors, seeking to obtain a share of tribal gaming revenues,
entered compacts only to be told by state supreme courts that the executive
lacked compacting authority absent state legislative approval. 2
Just as IGRA created a tug of war between branches of state government,
it also created conflicts among three agencies within the federal
government. This article will focus on areas in which IGRA failed to
distribute power explicitly, creating confusion and litigation. It will evaluate
the power struggles within federal agencies that accompanied federal
8.
Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White was the
fifth vote. Id.
9.
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
10. Id. at 66.
11. Id. at 75-76.
12. For early examples, see State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992),
State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995); Narragansett Indian Tribe of R.I. v.
Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280 (R.I. 1995); see also Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in
Indian Gaming, 1 Wyo. L. REv. 427 (2001) (collecting cases). For more recent examples, see
Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 990 So. 2d 1035, (Fla. 2008); Saratoga County Chamber
of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 2003).
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implementation of the law. After introducing the federal actors, this article
will discuss three principal problem areas, including gaming classification
questions, regulatory independence in litigation, and Indian lands decisions.
It will demonstrate some of the effects of jurisdictional ambiguity at the
federal level, the most notable of which may be an increase in tribal
sovereignty as a result of federal paralysis.

I.

INTRODUCING THE KEY FEDERAL ACTORS IMPLEMENTING

A.

IGRA

The NationalIndian Gaming Commission

When Congress enacted IGRA, it created the National Indian Gaming
Commission ("NIGC"), an "independent Federal regulatory authority." 3
Though it is located "within the Department of the Interior,"' 4 it is
nevertheless substantially independent. The NIGC is headed by a
presidentially appointed Chairman, who must be confirmed with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and who serves a fixed term of three years. 5
During a term, the Chairman may be removed from office only for neglect
of duty, malfeasance, or other cause.16
NIGC independence was controversial from the beginning. When the
legislation was being debated in Congress, the Reagan Administration,
speaking through the Department of Justice ("Justice") strongly objected to
the limitations on the power to remove commissioners of the NIGC. 7
Congress rejected this argument. The "for cause" provision makes the
NIGC an "independent regulatory agency," as this term is commonly used
by administrative law theorists and in case law.' 8 And while the term gives
the NIGC a strong measure of political independence, the NIGC's
13.
14.

25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (2006).
Id. § 2704.

15.

Id. §§ 2704(b)(1)(a), (4)(a).

16.
17.

Id. § 2704(b)(6).
See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 22, 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071

(letter to Congress from then-Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton).
18. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that, by
statute, Congress may limit the power of the President to remove an officer of the United States
in the manner prescribed by Congress, such as for explicit cause); Weiner v. United States, 357
U.S. 349 (1958) (holding that the President lacks the power to remove certain officials and
reaffirming Humphrey's Ex 'r). Congressionally-imposed limits on the power of the President to
remove Presidential appointees are controversial as a matter of constitutional interpretation, and
thus, the legitimacy of the independence of the so-called "fourth branch" of government is the
subject of much debate. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (discussing unitary executive theory).
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independence is sharply limited by three other aspects of IGRA and
governmental organization.
First, IGRA provides that the NIGC's annual budget must be prepared
"in coordination with the Secretary," 19 which means, as a practical matter,
that the NIGC's annual appropriation request is reviewed by the Interior
Secretary and the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). Given
Secretarial and OMB involvement, the executive branch maintains a tight
rein on the purse strings of this agency. Under OMB rules, the NIGC cannot
even approach Congress on budgetary matters without OMB's permission.
Since the federal budget process occurs annually, and the NIGC needs to
protect its appropriation, such control necessarily limits the political
independence of the agency.
Second, the NIGC lacks independent litigation authority. Like most other
agencies, it has regulatory and enforcement powers, but if there is a need to
utilize the courts, the NIGC is represented by the Attorney General of the
United States. ° In other words, it cannot even use the federal court to
enforce a lawful subpoena without the approval and the involvement of the
Department of Justice.2"
Finally, the NIGC is not the only agency with responsibilities for the
interpretation of IGRA or the federal gambling laws generally. The
Department of the Interior ("Interior") has an extensive role in Indian
gaming that is recognized in IGRA, 22 as does Justice, and Justice has
enforcement responsibility for numerous criminal statutes that address
gambling, only a few of which are explicitly exempted from application to
Indian gaming."
B.

The Department of the Interiorand the Bureau of Indian Affairs

Before the NIGC came into existence, there was the Bureau of Indian
Affairs ("Bureau" or "BIA"). The Bureau is the primary actor within
Interior on Indian gaming matters. Many of the important decisions
delegated by Congress to the Interior Secretary have been further delegated

19. 25 U.S.C. § 2717(b)(1) (2006).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (providing that the right and responsibility to conduct
litigation in which "an agency, or officer thereof' is a party is reserved to the Attorney General
unless otherwise provided by law).
21. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2715(b) (2006).
22. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 27 10(d) (2006) (tribal-state compacts); § 2711(b)(3) (per capita
distribution plans); § 2719(b)(1) (gaming on newly-acquired Indian lands).
23. See, e.g., § 2710(d)(6) (making the Johnson Act inapplicable to Class III gaming); §
2720 (making federal lottery statutes inapplicable to Indian gaming).
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by the Secretary to the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, or to the
Bureau.
Interior, through the Bureau and the Interior Solicitor, was involved in
Indian gaming long before the enactment of IGRA. Indeed, if not for the
enthusiastic support of the Bureau, the tribal right to conduct gaming may
never have been confirmed in 1987 by the United States Supreme Court in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.24 In a 6-3 decision, the
Cabazon majority weighed the competing interests of the state and federal
governments and ultimately found that the federal interests in favor of
Indian gaming preempted the state's asserted interests in preventing it. In
documenting the Bureau's involvement in Indian gaming, the majority
found "the [Federal] Government's approval and active promotion of tribal
bingo enterprises" to be "of particular relevance in this case."25 Since the
Solicitor General of the United States declined to file a brief in the case, the
Bureau's actions in support of Indian gaming was the primary evidence of
the keen federal interest. Thus, Indian gaming might never have received
the blessing of the Supreme Court without the strong support of the Bureau
and the Secretary.
Prior to the enactment of IGRA in 1988, the Bureau exercised pervasive
involvement in Indian gaming. For example, the Bureau routinely reviewed
and approved tribal ordinances establishing and regulating gaming
26
as
operations. It also made grants and guaranteed loans to finance the
operations.27 Under the authority of Section 81,28 which authorized the
Secretary the power to review contracts by Indian tribes relative to Indian
lands, the Bureau sometimes reviewed "management contracts" for the
development and operation of Indian gaming operations.29
In enacting IGRA, however, Congress dramatically reorganized the
scope of Interior's responsibilities over Indian gaming. Just as God pulled a
rib from Adam to make Eve, Congress pulled key responsibilities from the
Bureau to construct the portfolio of the NIGC. Congress transferred to the
newly created NIGC the Bureau's authority to review tribal gaming
ordinances.3" It also explicitly transferred to the NIGC the Bureau's

24. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
25. Id.at 217-18.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2006).
29. Such review apparently was not performed systematically until sometime in 1984. See
generally United States ex rel. Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Cmty. v. Pan Am. Mgmt. Co.,
616 F. Supp. 1200, 1205-06 (D. Minn. 1985).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
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authority under Section 81 to review Indian gaming management contracts3 '
and created new standards for approval of such contracts.32
IGRA also granted some additional functions to Interior. For example,
IGRA gave Interior the responsibility to review tribal-state Class III gaming
compacts and to grant a waiver in very limited circumstances to the general
prohibition on gaming on lands taken into trust after the enactment of
IGRA. 33
While the Secretary has delegated to the Assistant Secretary or the
Bureau most of the important tasks for which the Secretary is ultimately
responsible with regard to Indian gaming, the Bureau has no in-house legal
counsel. The Office of the Solicitor, which is outside of the Bureau, has the
primary responsibility for representing the Bureau in agency litigation and
communicating with outsiders regarding matters in litigation in the federal
courts.
The lack of in-house legal counsel handicaps the Bureau in two ways.
First, the Interior Solicitor reports to the Secretary, not to the Bureau or
even the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs. This means that the Solicitor
views the Secretary to be his primary client, and the Bureau to be a
secondary client. This may give the Solicitor a broader perspective on legal
questions, but it may well also diminish the Solicitor's responsiveness to the
Bureau. This problem is compounded by two other factors. First, the
Solicitor is a much higher profile official than the Assistant Secretary for
Indian Affairs within Interior and is more likely to be an insider within the
Interior leadership team. Second, the Bureau often has weak or no
politically-appointed leadership. As a result, the Bureau may have relatively
little influence as to many of the highly salient legal issues within Interior
involving Indian affairs.
The second handicap resulting from the lack of in-house legal counsel is
that only the Solicitor may communicate Interior's preferences about
matters in litigation to the Department of Justice. Among other
ramifications, this weakens the influence that the Assistant Secretary of
Indian Affairs and the Bureau may have over matters in litigation, even if
the Bureau is nominally the party to the litigation. For example, when a
tribe makes a litigation request of Interior, it may attempt to lobby the
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, but it is the Solicitor who will make
the decision. In sum, the Solicitor's Office lack of accountability to the
Bureau makes the Bureau impotent in countless ways.
31.
32.
33.
gaming

Id. § 2711(h).
Id. §§ 2711(a)-(e), 2710(d)(9).
Id. § 2710(d) (tribal state compacts), id. § 2719(b) (an exception to the prohibition of
on lands taken into trust after October 17, 1988).
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The Department of Justice

In IGRA, Congress did not explicitly discuss the Department of Justice
in any significant manner. However, Justice is keenly relevant in Indian
gaming for at least two reasons. First, as mentioned above, it provides legal
counsel to Interior and the NIGC and routinely represents these agencies in
federal court. By leveraging its role as litigation counsel, Justice often
broadens its "legal advice" into the policy arena and provides policy
directives. Second, Justice has a long-standing independent interest in
gambling that has a lengthy historical foundation. Justice has long
conducted civil and criminal regulatory enforcement efforts in this area on
its own behalf under statutes providing it clear authority.3 4 Even aside from
criminal enforcement, Justice has taken an active role in gaming throughout
its history.

1.

Justice as Litigation Counsel

Justice's role as the attorney for the other two agencies makes it a very
important institutional player in Indian gaming. Most significant disputes in
Indian gaming ultimately find their way into federal court. 35 Because
neither the NIGC nor Interior has independent litigating authority, it is
Justice that represents both agencies in litigation in federal court.36 This
representation by Justice has several ramifications. First, Justice sometimes
plays the referee in substantive disputes between the two agencies.
Second, Justice can effectively overrule either agency as to substance when
a matter is in court because it is the responsibility of Justice to articulate
that agency's position in court. This means that Justice can "confess error"
as to a substantive decision made by Interior or the NIGC and effectively
reverse the decision. Third, as a regulatory agency with investigative and
enforcement powers, the NIGC must sometimes engage the federal courts to
enforce subpoenas or regulatory orders. Since this requires action by
Justice, Justice may effectively undermine an enforcement initiative by the
NIGC.

34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (2006).
35. See generally FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 857-88
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005).
36. Under 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006), the "conduct of litigation" involving "the United
States, an agency, or officer thereof' is "reserved to officers of the Department of Justice."
37. See Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice's Conflict of
Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307, 1329 (2003) ("the
Justice Department is often used as the arbiter of inter- or intra-agency disputes.").
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In sum, the relationship between Justice and these two agencies is
radically different than the ordinary relationship between attorney and
client. Because Justice has the power to articulate the position of the United
States and its agencies in federal court,38 it also has the power to define that
position. Since Justice was given this representative role by Congress, an
agency cannot simply "fire" its attorney, as a private client could. This
means that, once a matter is in court, Justice effectively has the power to
make or change agency policy. While Justice does not routinely depart from
the represented-agency's position, and indeed usually works to reach
consensus with the interested officials as to the appropriate litigating
position, it effectively has the power to overrule an agency when it believes
it is appropriate to do so. Thus, the ordinary relationship between attorney
and client is inverted.
2.

Justice As Gambling Enforcement Agency

One reason that Justice is sometimes inclined to reject a position
articulated by Interior or the NIGC is that Justice has its own policy
positions on gaming and gambling. Justice has long had a central role in
regulating gambling in the United States and retains the primary role in
prosecuting gambling offenses.
Indeed, just as it was the Bureau's and Interior's vigorous support for
Indian gaming that won over the Supreme Court in Cabazon, Justice's own
independent interest in the subject matter left it on the sidelines in that
important case. When the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the
United States had a request to file an amicus brief. Then-Solicitor General
Charles Fried has said that the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice was strongly opposed to Indian gaming and believed it to be in
violation of federal criminal laws. 40 Exactly such an argument was asserted
by the State of California. 4' Thus, the Criminal Division strongly favored
weighing in on the side of California. 42 Having supported and effectively
authorized Indian gaming by approval of the tribal bingo ordinances,
Interior favored supporting the interests of the Cabazon Band. When the
Solicitor General informed a group of federal officials convened to discuss
38. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006).
39. Id.
40. Discussion with Charles Fried, Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, in
Cambridge, MA (April 2008).
41. Brief of Appellant, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987) (No. 85-1708), 1986 WL 728102.
42. Id.

ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

the case that he was leaning toward the Criminal Division's position,
representatives of Interior reportedly told him that he might as well send the
FBI to arrest the Secretary of the Interior; if Indian gaming was a criminal
enterprise, then the Secretary had clearly aided and abetted it. 43 At this
point, General Fried decided
it would be prudent for the United States to
44
case.
the
in
take no position
Justice's responsibilities for gambling are handled primarily by the
Criminal Division within the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section
("OCRS"), which enforces the criminal provisions on illegal gambling
businesses. 45 Gambling issues have also been handled by other Justice
components, including the Environment and Natural Resources Division,
which primarily represents Interior and often litigates against state
governments related to federal Indian affairs. 46 Because of the frequency of
disputes between agencies, the Office of Legal Counsel has often had
reason to become involved in the interpretation of IGRA. Likewise, because
of the seemingly endless opportunity for appellate litigation in this area, the
Solicitor General has also been deeply involved in gaming issues.
Given that it has criminal enforcement responsibility for numerous antigambling statutes, it is perhaps not surprising that Justice generally takes a
prohibitory view toward gambling. In the Indian gaming context, it has
sought to apply broadly the civil and criminal statutes that prohibit
gambling and to interpret narrowly the statutes that authorize limited forms
of gambling.47
While Justice's anti-gambling stance strongly influences Justice's
general policy approach toward Indian gaming, Justice has also had a
significant and important role to play in protecting Indian gaming. The U.S.
Attorney's Offices, which tend to work fairly independently of "main
Justice" on criminal matters, have primary responsibility for prosecuting
thefts from Indian casinos. Section 23 of IGRA specifically defines three
criminal offenses to be prosecuted by Justice.
Two of the criminal

43.
44.

Id.
Id.

45.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1511, 1955 (2006); see also U.S.

2085,

ATTORNEYS MANUAL, CRIMINAL

available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm02085.htm.
46. See, e.g., Governor of Kan. v. Kempthorne, 516 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008).
47. See, e.g., Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d
1019 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 324 F.3d 607 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. 162 Megamania Gambling Devices, 231 F.3d 713 (10th Cir. 2000);
Diamond Game Enters. v. Reno, 230 F.3d 365 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. 103 Elec.
Gambling Devices, 223 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2000).
48. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-68 (2006).
RESOURCE

MANUAL
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offenses are traditional property offenses involving theft or embezzlement
from Indian gaming establishments.49 As one might expect in an industry
involving vast sums of cash, federal prosecutors have been busy enforcing
these statutes. By now, Justice has likely prosecuted more than 100 such
cases since IGRA was enacted." ° Moreover, Justice has occasionally
interpreted these statutes in a creative manner beyond traditional modes of
theft to reach suspects who cheat in Indian casinos. 5
The third criminal statute enacted as part of IGRA assimilates state
gambling laws onto Indian lands for any gambling not performed pursuant
to IGRA.52 This statute, rarely enforced, creates exclusive federal
jurisdiction for violation of state gambling laws. It has the practical effect of
giving teeth to the Class III tribal-state compact requirement; any Class IIItype gaming performed in the absence of a compact theoretically exposes
the participants to federal prosecution to the same extent of state
prosecution if they were outside of Indian country.53
3.

Justice "Pluralism"

As the foregoing discussion indicates, Justice plays a wide variety of
roles in the Indian gaming context. Moreover, because of its sprawling
organizational structure and the dispersion of authority within the
organization, components of Justice reflect numerous, diverse legal
perspectives. In the past ten years, the Office of Solicitor General, the
Office of Legal Counsel, the Office of Tribal Justice, several sections of the
Environment, and Natural Resources Division (Appellate, Natural
Resources, Indian Resources, and the Policy Legislation and Special
Litigation), as well as several distinct units of the Criminal Division, have
played significant roles in litigation questions involving Indian gaming. In
many of these disputes, a local United States Attorney's Office, within a
state where litigation is proceeding, may also be heavily interested.
49. Id. § 1167 (defining misdemeanor and felony theft from gaming establishments on
Indian lands); id. § 1168 (defining two felony levels of theft by officers or employees of gaming
establishments on Indian lands).
50.

See generally GLENN A. FINE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF INDIAN GAMING

CRIMES,
REP.
No.
1-2001-06
(2001),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/eO106/results.htm (compiling statistics showing seventy
cases prosecuted under §§ 1167 and 1168 from 1992 to 2000).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 505 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
(convicting defendants in bench trial of theft for winning S 10,000 by submitting thousands of
counterfeit entry forms in a free casino give-away).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2006).
53. Id. § 1166(b).
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Thus, when Justice makes a significant decision with regard to civil
litigation, the decision-making process often involves input from numerous
components. Because the internal Justice components do not always express
unanimous agreement, it is a mistake to view Justice as a monolithic entity.
On the other hand, when Justice does formulate a final position, other
Justice officials tend to accept that decision, even if they disagree
vigorously. Protocol within Justice usually makes it clear which component
of Justice has authority to make a final decision on any given issue.
Moreover, the culture of Justice is to respect the chain of command. As a
result, Justice tends to speak with one clear voice. The "one voice" notion is
substantially facilitated by the fact that Justice tends to speak primarily in
legal briefs filed in court, creating an opportunity to negotiate and
"wordsmith" a unified position that carefully reconciles the nuances of
differing legal positions that may exist among Justice's components.
Internal disputes between components at Justice only rarely become
public because deliberations within the Justice are subject to attorney-client
privilege and because attorneys at Justice tend to respect hierarchy,
discretion, and confidentiality.54 When internal disputes happen, they tend
to undermine Justice's position as an advocate. 5

II.

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

The practical result of having three different major federal actors
involved in the regulation and oversight of Indian gaming is to create a
regime in which cooperation among federal actors is exceedingly important.
An actor may have tools to address only part of a problem and may need
cooperation from the other actors to address the problem fully. Moreover,
one of the actors can easily become an obstacle to the other two. Because of
the political nature of Indian gaming and public policy, full cooperation
among all three actors occurs only rarely. And even when full cooperation
is achieved among the executive branch actors, the courts do not always
agree.
In some circumstances, the conflict among federal authorities produces a
coordinated action problem that creates a sort of federal paralysis and that
may well have the effect of maximizing tribal sovereign authority. An
example is tribal revenue allocation plans authorized by IGRA. A 2003
Inspector General ("IG") report noted that the Interior has the authority to

54. Diamond Game Enters. v. Reno, 230 F.3d 365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing internal
Justice memo noting dispute between the Criminal Division and the Office of Tribal Justice).
55.

See id.
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approve or disapprove such plans, but no authority to take enforcement
actions against tribes that fail to comply with an approved plan.56 While the
NIGC had the authority to take enforcement action, the report noted that the
NIGC had not engaged in any monitoring of tribal revenue allocation plans
for compliance. Indeed, the NIGC responded to the IG's report by
suggesting that Interior should undertake compliance monitoring and then
refer the case to the NIGC if Interior identifies a problem.57
The result of such collective action difficulties may not be normatively
problematic. The lack of oversight frees the tribal governments to act as
they wish in distributing their gaming revenues. In other instances,
however, the collective action problem may serve as an obstacle to federal
actors who seek to use oversight powers in addressing circumstances
harmful to a tribe.
The scheme of disjointed and sometimes overlapping authority has other
implications as well. In some areas, it is unclear which actor possesses
regulatory authority. Thus, many aspects of Indian gaming are fraught with
uncertainty. Why is this problematic? The answer is that gaming is a
commercial activity. Commercial actors prefer predictability and certainty.
Indeed, commercial actors may prefer bad rules, which can be evaluated
and sometimes contracted around, to uncertain rules, which create
ambiguous risk that is much more difficult to "price." As a result,
uncertainty has very real economic ramifications. Examples of the problems
identified herein will be presented below.
A.

The Game Classification Wars: Face-OffBetween Justice and
the NIGC

In some ways, a problem arose in IGRA because of the lack of careful
thought in drafting the statute. This problem is apparent in the provisions on
classifications of games. Because the issue has, at times, placed the NIGC
and Justice at odds, it is a prime example of the tension between agencies
presaged by IGRA.

1.

IGRA and the Johnson Act

One of the matters that has vexed federal regulators at the NIGC and
Justice for more than a decade is the relationship between Class II
56. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, EVALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS'
PROCESS TO APPROVE TRIBAL GAMING REVENUE ALLOCATION PLANS. REP. No. 2003-1-0055 78 (2003), available at http://www.doioig.gov/upload/2003-I-0055.pdf
57. Id. at 23.
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"technological aids" and the Johnson Act. Though the cases are highly
technical and arcane, the overarching issue reflects a statutory turf battle
over who has the regulatory authority as to certain gaming machines.
The Johnson Act, originally enacted in 1951, regulates the transportation
of "slot machines. 58 It also regulates other machines or devices, such as
roulette wheels, that are "primarily ...[used for] . . . gambling" and which
a player can, through the application of an element of chance, win money or
property.5 9 The Johnson Act is a regulatory statute with criminal sanctions,
and it generally prohibits the transportation of such devices, except under
narrow circumstances. It also prohibits the mere possession of such devices
within Indian country.6" The Johnson Act was enacted at a time when
federal and state governments had adopted a strongly prohibitory stance
against gambling and gambling devices. Since the language of the Johnson
Act is broad, Justice has applied it broadly.
When IGRA was enacted, it divided profitable forms of gaming into two
categories: Class II games, such as bingo and pull-tabs;61 and Class III
games, which is a residual category including all other forms of gaming.62
Importantly, Congress indicated that bingo is a Class II game "whether or
not electronic, computer, or other technological aids are used in connection
therewith."63 However, Class II gaming explicitly does not include
"electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot
machines of any kind."64 Therefore, such devices necessarily fall into Class
III. Because of the fluidity of the terms used and because of the very nature
of technology, the line between a Class II "electronic, computer, or other
technological aid[]" to bingo and a Class III "electronic or
electromechanical facsimile or slot machine[] of any kind" is not crystal
clear.
If IGRA were the only statute that might be relevant to these questions,
the NIGC would have a compelling argument that it has the primary
responsibility to identify the murky line between these two classes of
gaming. However, since Justice, under the Johnson Act, has long had the
responsibility of prohibiting the transportation of slot machines and the
possession of such devices in Indian country, it claims a strong interest in
the subject. Indeed, the drafters of IGRA recognized the relevance of the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

JohnsonAct of 1951, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171(a)(1), 1172 (2006).
Id. § 1171(a)(2).
Id. § 1175(a).
25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A) (2006).
Id. § 2703(8).
Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i).
Id. § 2703(7)(B)(ii).
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Johnson Act when they explicitly provided that the Johnson Act would no
longer apply to Class III games operated under an effective tribal-state
Class III gaming compact.65 Because IGRA contains no provision
abrogating the Johnson Act for Class II gaming, the Department of Justice
has argued consistently that it has the authority to apply the Johnson Act to
Class II devices that come within its ambit and, further, that any device that
does come within this ambit is therefore a Class III device for which a
tribal-state compact is required.66
These two laws and the uncertain relationship between them set the stage
for significant conflict between the NIGC and Justice around the turn of the
century. The entire gaming industry developed primarily by exploiting
differences in state approaches to gambling, and the Indian gaming industry
especially developed by exploiting such differences.67 The lack of clarity in
the laws here spelled opportunity, particularly for gaming machine
developers and manufacturers. Gaming machine developers were in a
position to test the scope of the terms within IGRA. As gaming machines
grew in popularity and became far more profitable than card games played
on green felt tables, there was an incentive for gaming machine
manufacturers to build a better slot machine for Class III markets and to
build something equally attractive to serve Class II markets where tribes
lacked gaming compacts.68 Since the uncertainty in the language in IGRA
related to technology, the market sought to produce Class II games that had
the touch and feel of Class III slot machines and that would, therefore,
attract the same kind of interest.
Despite some early stumbles,69 the market succeeded in producing
cabinet games that had the "look and sound" of slot machines,7" but that
nevertheless could be characterized as Class II games. In the mid-1990s, the
NIGC undertook a series of negotiations with a key manufacturer of some
of these games; it encouraged the manufacturer to modify the game in such
a manner that the NIGC could conclude it was a Class II game, and the
65. Id. § 2703(7)(D).
66. Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier, Proposed Johnson Act Amendments Seek to "Clarify"
Distinction Between Class 1I and Class III Gaming, 10 GAMING L. REV. 4, 4-5 (2006).
67. See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV.
L.J. 285 (2004) (substantial prohibitions of gambling in state laws make Indian gaming viable
by creating monopolistic or oligopolistic market environments for Indian casinos).
68. See generally I. Nelson Rose, Technically Not Slot Machines, 8 GAMING L. REV. 225,
225 (2004).
69. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Com'n, 14 F.3d 633, 636
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (video pull tab machines were "facsimiles of games of chance and therefore
[were] Class III gaming" devices); Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v.Roache, 54 F.3d 535 (9th
Cir. 1994) (same).
70. United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 324 F.3d 607, 615 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003).
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NIGC ultimately opined that the game was a Class II game.71 The NIGC
opinions angered Justice.72 The NIGC generally adhered to its position, but
backed away from any claims that its Class II finding made the games
lawful under the Johnson Act.7 3

2.

A Storm of Litigation on Classification

Meanwhile, Justice declined to defer to the NIGC's classification and
took a much more aggressive stance as to such games. It soon filed civil
forfeiture actions under the Johnson Act in California and Oklahoma.74
Justice argued that because the putative Class II game played too fast,
proceeded at such a manic pace, and offered such high stakes, it could not
be characterized as bingo and was not a Class II game.75 In two cases,
Justice lost at the district court level when the district courts granted
summary judgment in favor of the tribes and gaming manufacturers, and in
both of these cases, Justice lost again on appeal.76 Ninth Circuit Judge
Berzon, writing for the court, rejected Justice's approach to defining bingo
as a "nostalgic inquiry into the vital characteristics of the game as it was
played in our childhoods or home towns" and held that Justice's "efforts to

71. Letter from Harold Monteau, Chairman, NIGC, to Larry Montgomery, President,
Multimedia Games, Inc. (July 10, 1996) (on file with author), available at
http://nigc.gov/Portals/O/NIGC%2OUploads/readingroom/gameopinions/bingo/Megamania%20
071096.pdf (concluding that MegaMania is a Class II game); Letter from Ada Deer, Acting
Chair, NIGC, to Larry Montgomery, President, Multimedia Games, Inc. (April 9, 1997) (on file
with
author),
available
at
http://nigc.gov/Portals/O/NIGC%2OUploads/readingroom/gameopinions/class 2011%2Ogames/
megamania04O997.pdf (finding MegaMania to be a Class II bingo game).
72. See, e.g., Letter from Ada Deer, Acting Chair, NIGC, to Larry Montgomery, President,
Multimedia
Games,
Inc.
(March
28,
1997),
available
at
http://nigc.gov/Portals/O/NIGC%2OUploads/readingroom/gameopinions/bingo/Changes%20to%
20Megamania%2OSystem%203.28.97.pdf (indicating that the NIGC had consulted with the
Department of Justice and ordering MegaMania to stop play of the MegaMania game until it
had changed certain characteristics).
73. Letter from Penny Coleman, Acting Gen. Counsel, NIGC, to Larry Montgomery,
President, Multimedia Games, Inc. (July 23, 1997) (on file with author), available at
http://nigc.gov/Portals/O/NIGC%2OUploads/readingroom/gameopinions/Class%2011%2OGames
/megamania072397.pdf (finding MegaMania to be a Class II bingo game, but refusing to opine
as to whether the game is a Johnson Act gambling device and refusing to speak for the
Department of Justice).
74. See infra notes 75-76.
75. United States v. 103 Elec. Gambling Devices, 223 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2000).
76. Id.; United States v. 162 Megamania Gambling Devices, 231 F.3d 713 (10th Cir.
2000).
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capture more completely the Platonic 'essence' of traditional bingo" were
not helpful.77
In both cases, the circuit courts made careful inquiries into the technical
requirements of the game of bingo as elucidated in the NIGC regulations.
And both courts ultimately relied heavily on the NIGC's views in finding
the game at issue to be Class II bingo?' 9 Aside from its opinion letters and
regulations,8" the NIGC was a bystander to the litigation.
In these cases, Justice was litigating under its own authority as the
agency responsible for enforcing the Johnson Act and was representing the
United States as opposed to a client agency. The result was curious. In the
first major disagreement between the NIGC and Justice, the NIGC had
conceded the field to Justice. Yet the NIGC prevailed when private parties
carried the NIGC's banner into battle, as the NIGC watched from the
sidelines.
In both cases, the courts held that the Johnson Act provisions do not
apply to gaming machines characterized as Class II aids to bingo.8" In Judge
Berzon's words, "IGRA quite explicitly indicates that Congress did not
intend to allow the Johnson Act to reach bingo aids." 82 Though this
statement resolved the issue in the case, it was patently false, or at least
highly exaggerated. If Congress had clearly made such a statement in
IGRA, Justice might have agreed that the NIGC was the master of the
determinations of the scope of the Johnson Act in the game classification
context in Indian gaming. That Congress did explicitly preempt the Johnson
Act as to Class III gaming made its application all the more uncertain as to
Class II gaming.
The next case to arise was a declaratory action by Diamond Game
Enterprises seeking a determination that its Lucky Tab II gaming device
was a Class II game. 3 In this case, though the game's manufacturers had
sought a classification opinion from the NIGC, the NIGC did not oblige,
apparently because the commissioners of the NIGC were divided as to the
classification of the game.84
77. 223 F.3d at 1096.
78. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 502.8 (2009).
79. 223 F.3d at 1096-97; 231 F.3d at 722.
80. See supra notes 71-73.
81. 223 F.3d at 1101-02 ("IGRA quite explicitly indicates that Congress did not intend to
allow the Johnson Act to reach bingo aids."): 231 F.3d at 725 ("Congress did not intend the
Johnson Act to apply if the game at issue fits within the definition of a Class II game, and is
played with the use of an electronic aid.").
82. 223 F.3dat 1101.
83. Diamond Game Enter. v. Reno, 9 F. Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 1998).
84. Diamond Game Enter. v. Reno, 230 F.3d 365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Though the decisions within the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits might have
emboldened the NIGC in its game classification endeavors, these decisions
also made clear where the courts would look for expertise on such
questions. As a result, Justice aggressively lobbied the NIGC, producing
gridlock in decision-making at the NIGC. Indeed, at least one member of
the NIGC urged a gaming manufacturer to go to court for a gaming
determination.85
Though it was losing in similar cases under the Johnson Act in the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits, Justice prevailed in the district court in Diamond Game
Enter. v. Reno.8 6 When the case reached the D.C. Circuit, however, the
court was highly critical of the NIGC. The court was disappointed that it
was forced to proceed without the views of the agency charged with
implementing IGRA, and noted "we have no idea what the [NIGC] thinks
87 Though Justice
about the policy questions presented by the Lucky Tab I1."
vigorously argued that the game was a Class III electronic facsimile and
that the speed of play of the game would make it easier "to lose the rent
money,"88 the D.C. Circuit concluded, with little difficulty, that Lucky Tab
II was a Class II game.8 9
The decision in Diamond Game highlighted to the NIGC the need to take
a more active and central role in the classification of games. Disagreeing
with Justice is a sensitive matter, however, because of the attorney-client
problem discussed above. The NIGC lacks the authority to fire Justice as its
attorney, or even to express itself independently of Justice, at least
regarding matters in court. Justice has the actual (though perhaps not
legitimate) ability to dictate the NIGC's position in litigation. Moreover, if
the NIGC expresses itself outside of court in a manner that Justice views as
undermining it in litigation, the NIGC takes the risk that Justice will simply
refuse to take the NIGC's cases, or that Justice will confess error any time a
target of the NIGC's enforcement challenges that enforcement in court. In
sum, the dynamics require cooperation on many levels between the NIGC
and Justice.
Following the Diamond Game decision, the NIGC was in a bind. Though
it had not classified the Lucky Tab II game at issue in Diamond Game, it
had classified a very similar game, called Magic Irish Bingo, as a Class III

85. See United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb. (Santee I11), 324 F.3d 607, 609 (8th
Cir. 2003).
86. 9 F. Supp.2d at 13.
87. 230 F.3d at 366, 369.
88. Id. at 371.
89. Id.

AGENCY CONFLICT

42:0303]

game.9 ° Its classification of Magic Irish Bingo had been based, at least in
91
part, on the now-repudiated district court decision in Diamond Game.
Justice was then defending litigation in Oklahoma over the Magic Irish
Bingo opinion and continuing to press its own interpretation of the Johnson
Act. The bind for the NIGC was this: given the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Diamond Game, it would be exceedingly difficult for the NIGC to find that
game unlawful. If it continued to oppose games similar to the game at issue
in Diamond Game, it would essentially hand Diamond Game a monopoly
on those kinds of gaming machines.
3.

The NIGC Breaks Ranks with Justice

Though the NIGC did not withdraw its decision with respect to the
classification of Magic Irish Bingo, it did communicate to the parties that it
was willing to accept the D.C. Circuit's decision in Diamond Game that
Lucky Tab II was a Class II technological aid.92 Though the NIGC's new
position had dramatically undermined the position of Justice, Justice
continued to litigate the issue. Shortly thereafter, the parties in the Magic
Irish litigation stopped using the Magic Irish game and switched to the
Lucky Tab 11.93 The NIGC's position had substantially undermined
Justice's litigation efforts. The Tenth Circuit, in declining to find the matter
moot, ultimately ruled against Justice in Seneca-Cayuga.94 In its lengthy
decision, the Tenth Circuit again concluded, much more clearly and
forcefully than in its previous decision on this issue, 95 that the Johnson Act
was not applicable to Class II technological aids. 96

90. See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Gen. Counsel, NIGC, to Stephen A. Lenske, Esq.
(Feb.
29,
2000),
available
at
http://nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC /2OUploads/readingroom/gameopinions/bingo/magicalirishinsta
ntbingo022900.pdf (concluding that "Magic Irish Bingo" was a Class III gaming device).
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Gen. Counsel, NIGC, to Cyrus Schindler,
President,
Seneca
Nation
of
Indians
(May
31,
2001),
available at
http://nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%/o2OUploads/readingroom/gameopinions/Class /o20III /o2OGame
s/breakthebank053101.pdf (discussing Diamond Game opinion); Letter from William F. Grant,
Senior Attorney, NIGC, to John J. Gruttadaurio, Esq. (Mar. 21, 2001), available at
http://nigc.gov/Portals/O/NIGC%2OUploads/readingroom/gameopinions/Class%2011%2Games
/lucktabl1032101 .pdf (same).
93. Seneca-Cayuga Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comrnm'n, 327 F.3d
1019, 1027 (10th Cir. 2003).
94. Id. at 1027, 1044.
95. United States v. 162 Megamania Gambling Devices, 231 F.3d 713, 723-25 (10th Cir.

2000).
96.

Seneca-Cayuga, 327 F.3d at 1030-35.
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Meanwhile, the NIGC's acceptance of the Diamond Game decision
undermined Justice's position in longstanding litigation against the Santee
Sioux in Nebraska. In 1996, the NIGC had ordered closure of the Santee
Sioux gaming operation for operation of Class II gambling devices without
a compact. 97 Although the tribe initially complied, it soon reopened its
facility, prompting Justice to seek injunctive relief to enforce the NIGC
Chairman's closure order.98 When the district court granted an injunction,
the tribe refused to obey and the government moved for contempt,
eventually succeeding in obtaining a contempt judgment in excess of $1
million.99 In an effort to settle the matter, the Santee Sioux consulted the
NIGC. As the Eighth Circuit related, "the NIGC's Chief of Staff wrote a
letter to the Tribe's legal counsel suggesting that the Tribe install and
operate the Lucky Tab II dispensers. The NIGC thereafter dissolved its
closure order because it took the position that the Lucky Tab I is not a class
III gaming device."' 00 Justice strongly disagreed with the NIGC's
dissolution of the closure order. Despite the NIGC's clear position, Justice
continued to contend in the Eighth Circuit that Lucky Tab II was a Class II
gaming device and that it was prohibited by the Johnson Act. 101 The Eighth
Circuit ultimately rejected Justice's contentions. 102
After the Diamond Game decision and prior to the circuit court decisions
in the Magic Irish and Santee Sioux cases, the NIGC slightly modified its
longstanding definitional regulations to clarify the relevance of the Johnson
Act to the NIGC gaming classifications and to distance itself from Justice's
approach.'03 This action, no doubt, further insured Justice's defeat in those
cases. 10 4 Faced with five appellate losses in four different circuits, Justice
sought Supreme Court review in both Magic Irish and Santee Sioux on the
basis of an asserted circuit conflict regarding a narrow technical

97. United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb. (Santee 1), 135 F.3d 558, 564-65 (8th Cir.
1998).
98. Id.
99. See generally United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb. (Santee II), 254 F.3d 728,
735-37 (8th Cir. 2001).
100. Santee III, 324 F.3d 607, 609 (8th Cir. 2003).
101. Id. at 611.
102. Id. at 612.
103. The action was controversial within the Commission, producing a dissent by the
Chairman. Definitions: Electronic, Computer or other Technologic Aid; Electronic or
Electromechanical Facsimile; Game Similar to Bingo, 67 Fed. Reg. 41166-02 (June 17, 2002)
(to be codified at 25 C.F.R. §§ 502.7-502.9).
104. See, e.g., Santee III, 324 F.3d at 615-16 (describing the new regulations and
concluding that "the NIGC has now given its imprimatur to these types of machines").
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interpretation of the Johnson Act and IGRA.1 °5 The Supreme Court denied
both certiorari petitions," 6 effectively ending the litigation chapter on this
issue.
4.

Understanding the Cultural Gap Between the NIGC and Justice

While it is possible to conclude that Justice behaved unreasonably in this
litigation, Justice presented a credible legal argument. Given the lack of
clarity in IGRA as to how to interpret it in relation to the Johnson Act,
reasonable minds could differ as to the proper application of the Johnson
Act with regard to Indian gaming. This, however, does not explain why
Justice was so aggressive. One could argue that Justice has an interest in
protecting its authority and a duty to read its own statutes broadly to
effectuate Congressional intent. If distribution of such power is a zero-sum
game, then Justice might be inclined to read broadly the statutes over which
it exercises authority and to read narrowly the statutes over which other
agencies exercise primary authority. Though this answer might formally
answer the question, the real explanation of Justice's aggressiveness toward
Indian gaming may lie deep in Justice's cultural DNA.
Justice has a longstanding and deeply held antipathy toward gambling. A
defining moment for Justice was Attorney General Robert Kennedy's
efforts to combat organized crime, a component of which involved
gambling enforcement."' In doing so, Robert Kennedy dramatically
increased the stature of the Department in the public eye, giving it a much
higher enforcement profile than it ever had before. Indeed, Kennedy made
enactment of the Wire Act a centerpiece of his efforts. 108
In contrast to Justice's central role of prohibiting illegal gambling, the
NIGC was born out of a more permissive attitude toward gambling.
Moreover, Justice is a law enforcement agency. It is affected by the role it
plays as a lawyer. The criminal prosecutor at Justice is not accustomed to

105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla., 540 U.S.
1218 (2004) (No. 03-740), 2003 WL 22873066; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v.
Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 540 U.S. 1229 (2004) (No. 03-762), 2003 WL 22873068.
106. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d 1019 (10th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 135 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1998); Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft, 540 U.S. at 1218 (No. 03-740); Petition of Writ of Certiorari,
Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 540 U.S. at 1229 (No. 03-762).
107. H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 4-6 (1961), reprintedin 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2633-34
(letter from the then-Attomey General Robert F. Kennedy and proposed legislation that would
ultimately become the Wire Act 18 U.S.C § 1084 (2006)).
108. See generally DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMBLING PROHIBITION AND
THE INTERNET (2005).
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being lobbied by affected members of the industry and may believe it
improper even to speak to lobbyists. Likewise, the civil litigator at Justice
generally may not speak directly to an opposing party without counsel
present. In contrast, lobbying by the affected industry happens often at a
regulatory agency, like the NIGC. The NIGC is thus likely more inclined
than Justice to be responsive to regulated entities.
While the NIGC tends to be somewhat responsive to regulated entities,
Justice is tone deaf to the political realities in the Indian gaming industry.
After losing repeatedly in the litigation discussed above, Justice drafted a
bill that would have achieved legislatively what it could not persuade the
courts to accept through litigation. 109 However, Justice was apparently
unsuccessful in finding a member of Congress willing to introduce the bill
and it failed to get any formal hearing. Thereafter, Justice came full circle
back to the NIGC and attempted to persuade the NIGC to adopt rule
changes to accomplish some of Justice's purposes." l° Ultimately, after
substantial pushback from the Indian gaming industry, the NIGC declined
to adopt such an approach through formal rules.'11
The relationship between Justice and the NIGC has been rocky, but it is
only one side of the federal triangle. As the next section demonstrates, the
relationship between the NIGC and Interior has also been sometimes rocky.
B.

DOI v. the NIGC: Establishingthe NIGC's Independence of Interior
in Cobell v. Secretary of the Interior

The relationship between Interior and the NIGC, while sometimes
cooperative, was tested as part of the ongoing litigation in Cobell v. United
States.112 This litigation helped establish the independence of the NIGC and
showcased dramatic differences in the roles of the two agencies.
109. Letter from William. E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Richard B. Cheney,
President,
United
States
Senate
(June
7,
2006),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/amendments2006.pdf. The bill was entitled, the "Gambling Devices
Act Amendments of 2006."
110. See, e.g., Classification Standards for Bingo . . When Played Through an Electronic
Medium, 71 Fed. Reg. 30238-61 (May 25, 2006) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 502).
111. See Press Release, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, NIGC Approves Class II Minimum
Internal
Control,
Technical
Standards
(Sept.
24,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/PressReleases/ PR103092008/tabid/885/Default.aspx; Press
Release, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rule (Sept. 24,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/O/NIGC / 2OUploads/readingroom/pressreleases/FacsimiIeWithdra
wal.pdf.
112. To date, this case encompasses numerous published opinions in the D.C. Circuit and
numerous opinions and orders below. See Cobell v. Salazar (Cobell IV), 573 F.3d 808 (D.C Cir.
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In IGRA, Congress created the NIGC and located it "within" the
Department of the Interior. 1'3 However, the NIGC is an independent federal
regulatory agency occupying the same unusual governmental space
occupied by numerous other "fourth branch" agencies, such as the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (established within the Department of
Energy). 114 The NIGC Chairman is presidentially-appointed and must be
confirmed by the Senate; the Associate Commissioners are appointed by the
Secretary of the Interior. "5 The independence of the Chairman and
Commissioners, and thus the agency, is established by the language in
IGRA that provides that none of these officials can be removed, except for
cause. "' Such independence, however, is limited by practical needs and
political necessity.
From the late 1990s up to the present, Interior has been embroiled in
Cobell v. United States, one of the most complex Indian trust cases ever to
be filed against the United States."' On December 17, 2001, Judge Royce
Lamberth of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, who was
then presiding over the Cobell case, ordered Interior to disconnect entirely
from the Internet. 118 The justification for the order was the court's concern
that the lack of security on Interior computers gave rise to a fear that
hackers could access Interior computers and manipulate Indian trust data.119
In January 2002, during a routine meeting at Interior between the NIGC
Office of General Counsel and BIA's Indian Gaming Management Staff,
attorneys from the NIGC mentioned an item that they had seen on an
Internet website about a pending gaming matter that was relevant to both
offices. Soon after the NIGC attorneys returned to the NIGC, they received
a call from attorneys within the Solicitor's Office of Interior, expressing
concern that the NIGC remained connected to the Internet in violation of

2009); Cobell v. Kempthome (Cobell i1), 455 F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2006): Cobell v. Norton
(Cobell I1), 392 F.3d 461 (D.C. Cir. 2004), Cobell v. Babbitt (Cobell 1), 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
113. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2006).
114. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established By Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent FederalAgencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1111, 1141-44 (2000).
115. 25 U.S.C. § 2704(b)(1) (2006).
116. Id. § 2704(b)(6).
117. See Cobell III, 455 F.3d at 302 (partial listing of citations).
118. Cobell v. Norton, 274 F. Supp. 2d 111, 135 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing genesis of
injunction requiring the Department of the Interior to "immediately disconnect from the Internet
all Information Technology Systems within [its] custody or control
until such time as the
Court approves their reconnection to the Internet").
119. Id. at 127, 135-36.
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Judge Lamberth's order in Cobell.120 The attorneys asserted that, as a
component of Interior, the NIGC was subject to the order. 121
Furious negotiations and analysis followed while the NIGC reviewed the
Cobell order and sought guidance from Justice as to whether the order
applied to the NIGC. 122 The NIGC did not possess Indian trust account
data.123 Moreover, because of the nature of the Indian gaming industry and
the responsibility to process literally hundreds of gaming employee
background investigation applications each week, if the Cobell order had
been applicable to the NIGC, it would have substantially interrupted the
NIGC's ability to meet its regulatory responsibilities. Moreover, the
NIGC's General Counsel was concerned that Interior was interpreting the
Cobell order in a manner designed to inflict maximum pain within Indian
country to bring negative pressure to bear on Judge Lamberth and the
Cobell plaintiffs. 124
The attorneys at the Solicitor's Office asserted fears that the Secretary
might be held in contempt of court if the NIGC did not immediately comply
with the order.125 The NIGC responded that it was an independent agency.
that it was not a named party in Cobell, and that it had never previously
been consulted
by Justice or Interior about the case, nor had it participated
26
in any way. 1

After more than a week of heated discussions in which Justice was
brought into the conversation, the NIGC General Counsel had a final
conversation on a Friday afternoon with several attorneys at Interior and
Justice working on the case.1 27 During the conversation, Phil Hogen, then
Associate Solicitor of Indian Affairs at Interior, attempted to strike a
conciliatory tone. To the NIGC General Counsel, he said, "[1]ook, we are up
to our [necks] in alligators and we are arguing about how to drain the
swamp; let's just work together and follow the order until we can all find a
120. Some of these facts are recollections of the author, who was then the General Counsel
of the NIGC.
121. See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, to
Alan Balaran, Cobell Special Master (Jan. 26, 2002) (on file with author).
122. Id. (outlining the content of those discussions).
123. Id.
124. For two different views of Judge Lamberth's handling of the case, compare Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Judge Lambert's Reign of Terror at the Department of Interior, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
235 (2004), with Jamin B. Raskin, Professor Richard J. Pierce's Reign of Error in the
AdministrativeLaw Review, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 229 (2005).
125. Recollection of the author, who was then the General Counsel of the NIGC.
126. Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, to
Sandra Spooner, Cobell Lead Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with
author).
127. Recollection of the author.
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way to get out from under it.' ' 128 The NIGC General Counsel responded
with an analogy from a different aquatic environment: "On the contrary,
Interior seems to have purchased tickets for a ride on the Titanic, and you
are trying to sell one of them to the NIGC. We've seen how that one ended.
We saw the movie. We are not inclined to buy a ticket and go down with
you. ' 129 Because the meeting ended with no capitulation by the NIGC. the
attorneys at the Solicitor's Office warned that the Secretary would be
sending a letter that would order the NIGC Chairman to disconnect from the
Internet.
Later that Friday evening, Secretary Gail Norton faxed a letter to the
NIGC referring to the lengthy communications with the General Counsel
and ordered the NIGC Chairman Montie Deer to disconnect the NIGC's
Internet connection immediately.13 ° This letter placed the NIGC in an
awkward position. The Secretary, despite being a Cabinet-level official,
lacked any legal authority to order the Chairman of the NIGC to act. But
because the matter was in litigation, and because Justice had been working
closely with Interior, Justice might well feel duty-bound to honor the
position that had been adopted at the very highest level at Interior and might
overrule the NIGC's position. Because it was a matter in litigation and
Justice was acting within its authority to represent the NIGC, Justice
essentially could have consented on behalf of the NIGC to a finding that the
order applied to the NIGC. NIGC might well have been bound by its
attorney's assertion. 13'
To avoid taking such a risk, the NIGC responded early Saturday morning
by filing its own letter brief with the Cobell Special Master. 32 In the letter
brief, the NIGC asserted that it sought to be immediately forthcoming with
the court in light of the concern that the court might interpret the order to
apply to the NIGC. 133 In the brief, the NIGC waived its attorney-client
privilege regarding communications on the matter, attached copies of its
lengthy written correspondence with Interior and Justice, provided
arguments as to why the order should not apply to the NIGC, and finally,

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Letter from Gale A. Norton, Sec'y, Dep't of Interior, to Montie R. Deer, Chairman,
Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n (Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with the author).
131. See HAROLD J. KRENT. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 65 (2005) (noting that "[j]hen two
agencies' views differ, then either the Department of Justice or the courts must resolve the
clash").
132. Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, to
Alan Balaran, Cobell Special Master (Jan. 26, 2002) (on file with author).
133. Id.
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offered to disconnect from the Internet immediately if the Special Master
deemed such action mandatory according to the order.' 34
After reviewing the NIGC's letter brief, the Special Master contacted the
NIGC on Saturday afternoon for more information. 35 On Monday morning,
the NIGC filed a letter providing examples of different sorts of data in its
information systems that might fall within the broadest interpretation of the
Cobell order, 136 and later 3provided
additional information about its
7
1
security.
systems
information
The denouement to the NIGC's brush with Cobell was the court's
decision not to order the NIGC to follow the Cobell order.' 38 The court's
decision to take no action vindicated the NIGC Chairman's decision to
decline to follow a direct order by Secretary Norton.
Because it was the first time the NIGC Chairman had rejected a direct
order from the Secretary of the Interior, the Cobell episode clarified the
NIGC's independence from Interior. As a practical matter, the NIGC's
action also reflected its political independence in high profile litigation. In
defying the Secretary, the NIGC signaled that it took its responsibility
seriously to provide effective regulation of Indian gaming, and this
responsibility took precedence over blind loyalty to another agency that
might have been acting for political purposes.
This episode provided insight on the precarious position that the NIGC
occupies with respect to the attorneys at Justice. Only by fortunate
circumstances was the NIGC able to outmaneuver Justice and Interior and
approach the court directly. The NIGC's lack of independent litigation
authority, its small size, and its political independence from Interior make it
vulnerable when it attempts to take a position in court that is at odds with
Interior. Because Justice and Interior are part of the Executive branch, the
NIGC's very independence sometimes makes it the "odd man out" in its
relational triangle with Justice and Interior.
The insight of this episode is that IGRA failed to give the NIGC
independent litigation authority, rendering the NIGC subject to the views of
Justice and, to a lesser extent, Interior, regarding the exercise of the NIGC's
mission. Given the highly political nature of many aspects of Indian
gaming, the lack of independent litigation authority means that some of the
NIGC decisions will occasionally be driven by political considerations at
134. Id.
135. Recollection of the author.
136. Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, to
Alan Balaran, Cobell Special Master (Jan. 28, 2002) (on file with author).
137. Recollection of the author.
138. Id.
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Justice or Interior, rather than what is best for the regulation of Indian
gaming.
Congress has given some agencies independent litigating authority. 39
Presumably, one reason that the drafters of IGRA created the NIGC as an
independent agency was to professionalize its focus as a regulatory body
and to make the agency less subject to the political whims of any given
administration. If the drafters of IGRA were truly concerned about keeping
political judgments out of the regulation of Indian gaming, however,
Congress should have granted the NIGC independent litigating authority.
C.

Indian Lands Issues: Conflict Between Interior and NIGC

Prior to IGRA, the Secretary of the Interior had broad authority under
Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA") to acquire lands for
Indian tribes by virtually any voluntary means. 40 The general purpose of
the IRA, enacted in 1934, was to reject the allotment policies and halt the
4
erosion of the tribal land base that had occurred during the allotment era.1 '
During the era immediately prior to adoption of the IRA, from roughly 1887
to 1934, approximately 90 million acres was lost to Indian tribes. 42 The
IRA sought to stem the losses, and, moreover, in Section 5, Congress gave
the Secretary the discretion to acquire lands for Indians to reverse some of
43
the land losses. 1
When IGRA was enacted, Congress appears to have sought to limit
expansion of gaming, but it evinced no intent to limit the acquisition of trust
lands for Indian tribes. IGRA offered two simple and relatively
straightforward rules designed to address both interests.144 IGRA provided,
first, that Indian tribes can conduct gaming only on "Indian lands,"' 145 and,
139. Congress has conferred independent litigation authority on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Federal Election Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the
National Labor Relations Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, to name a few
examples. See KRENT, supra note 131, at 64.
140. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006).
141. Mary Jane Sheppard, Taking Indian Land into Trust, 44 S.D. L. REV. 681, 681 n.1
(1999).
142. The Purposes and Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Rights Bill. Hearings on
H.R. 7902 Befbre the S. and H. Comms. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 15-18 (1934)
(memorandum of John Collier), reprinted in part in DAVID GETCHES, ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 171 (4th ed. 1998).
143. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006).
144. Id. §§ 2710(b)(1), 2710(d)(1).
145. According to the definition provided in the statute: "The term 'Indian lands' means(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and (B) any lands' title to which is
either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held
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second, that no tribe can conduct gaming on lands taken into trust outside of
Indian reservations after the enactment of IGRA in 1988.146 Both rules were
generally designed to prevent the expansion of gambling. The first rule was
presumably designed to ensure that Indian tribes could continue to conduct
and expand Indian gaming within their existing lands, but at the same time
create a clear geographical or territorial limit to growth in Indian gaming.
By ensuring that gaming generally could not be conducted on land taken
into trust after the enactment of IGRA in 1988, the second rule presumably
sought to preserve the ability to take land into trust without concern that
such acquisitions would cause further expansion of gambling.
Ultimately, IGRA's structure fulfilled neither of these apparent goals
well. Moreover, IGRA's structure has had the effect of undermining
Congress's efforts in the IRA to assist tribes in reclaiming lands lost during
the allotment era. This section further explains some of these problems.

1.

IGRA Section 20 and IRA Section 5.

IGRA authorizes gaming only on Indian lands. 47 It defines "Indian
lands" as "lands within the limits of any Indian reservation,"' 4 8 tribal or
individual trust lands, 49 or tribal or individual fee lands subject to a federal
restriction on alienation, as long as an Indian tribe has governmental power
to regulate. 5 ' While one could quibble with the way that the NIGC has
interpreted IGRA in this area, 15 1 the rule is relatively clear. Section 20 of
by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation
and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power." Id. § 2703(4) (2006).
146. Id. § 2719(a).
147. Id. § 2702(3).
148. Id. § 2703(4)(A).
149. Id. § 2703(4)(B).
150. Id.
151. Id. As this section indicates, IGRA explicitly requires a tribe to demonstrate that it
exercises governmental powers over fee lands subject to a federal restriction on alienation. This
is a sensible requirement in light of the fact that a tribe has significant regulatory responsibilities
with regard to Indian gaming. A tribe cannot meet this responsibility if it lacks governmental
authority with regard to the land in question. In sum, IGRA provides that a tribe may not label
an activity "Indian gaming" if it lacks the authority to regulate that activity.
IGRA differentiated between fee lands and trust and reservation lands; however, IGRA did
not impose a requirement of proof of governmental authority over reservation lands; it assumes
it. Id. Likewise, IGRA did not clearly impose such a requirement on trust lands that are outside
of reservations. Very early on, however, the NIGC made the further decision to require tribes to
prove tribal governmental authority before conducting gaming on land held in trust by the
federal government. 25 C.F.R. § 502.12 (1999). See Definitions under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,382, 12,388, 12,393 (Apr. 9, 1992) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R.
pt. 500). Congress has long distinguished between fee lands and trust lands for purposes of
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IGRA imposes a further restriction: No gaming shall occur on lands taken
into trust by the Interior Secretary after the enactment of IGRA in 1988. *2
If these two simple rules were the only rules to govern new Indian gaming
lands acquisitions, however, they would unduly and unfairly narrow gaming
opportunities for certain tribes.' 53 To address this problem, Congress created
numerous exceptions to the prohibition on gaming on lands taken into trust
after 1988.154
Indeed, the Section 20 prohibition on gaming lands acquired after
IGRA's 1988 enactment has a certain "Swiss cheese" quality, creating
several holes in the basic prohibition. The exceptions in Section 20 help to
make this section one of the most convoluted and poorly drafted provisions
of IGRA.155 The graceless drafting in Section 20 reflects political wrangling
over the scope of the prohibition and the reach of its exceptions. As in many
laws, statutory elegance was sacrificed for political expediency.
Although Section 20's exceptions are numerous, each is fairly
circumscribed and relatively clear. All of them consist of non-waivable
legal rules, and almost none provide any room for agency discretion
regarding the prohibition or its exceptions. In only one limited circumstance
does IGRA provide federal agency discretion to waive the prohibition on
lands taken into trust after IGRA's enactment. Under the so-called "twopart" test, the Secretary may waive the prohibition on gaming on such lands
if: 1) after consulting with the tribe and state and local officials, the Interior
tribal authority. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ l151(a)-(b) (2006) (general definition of Indian
country). See also id. §§ 1154, 1156 (Indian liquor laws). Thus the NIGC probably need not
have sought to require proof of governmental authority over trust lands. Since tribal
governments generally have authority over their federal trust lands, and because federal trust
status generally preempts state authority on Indian trust lands, proof that an Indian tribe holds
lands in trust may be adequate to prove that the tribe has governmental authority over such
lands. The wording of IGRA on this point may have given rise to confusion or uncertainty.
152. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) (2006).
153. For example, tribes not recognized and without a reservation at the relevant time in
1988 might never be able to conduct gaming. See id. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii).
154. Restrictions are imposed on Indian lands acquired after October 17, 1988. See
generally id. § 2719.
155. A close competitor for most convoluted drafting, however, is Section 11 of IGRA
which addresses tribal gaming ordinances, revenue allocation plans, tribal state compacts, and,
curiously, Class III management contract requirements. See id. § 2710(d)(9). The location of the
Class III management contract requirements is curious because the very next section of IGRA,
Section 12, is styled "Management Contracts" and it deals fairly comprehensively with the
general management contract requirements. Class III gaming management contracts are often
the most lucrative and "high stakes" contracts in Indian gaming. Burying the provisions for
Class III management contract review in a convoluted section outside the "management
contracts" section of IGRA has confused more than a few experienced Indian gaming attorneys
who had difficulty determining the source of the NIGC's authority over Class III management
contracts.
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Secretary determines that it would be in the best interest of the tribe and not
detrimental to the surrounding community; and 2) the governor of the state
in which the land lies concurs in the Secretary's determination.156 Given the
required consultation in making the determination, this exception is
inherently political in nature. Furthermore, given the requirements of
consultation of local and state officials, assessment of best interests, and
gubernatorial concurrence, the discretion granted therein is quite limited,
effectively to non-controversial applications.
While Section 20 is ungainly, it is relatively easy to apply. Moreover, in
light of the basic clarity in both the general rule and its exceptions,
Congress left little need for any expert agency interpretation of the scope of
the exceptions. Except for the narrow exception requiring gubernatorial
concurrence, Section 20 affords no particular authority or interpretive
discretion to any federal agency.157 Moreover, while Section 20 prohibits
gaming on lands taken into trust after IGRA's 1988 enactment, Section 20
also expressly provides that it does not "affect or diminish" the Secretary's
"authority and responsibility" to take land into trust for Indian tribes.158
In sum, IGRA seems to be structured to minimize agency discretion and
to render gaming a non-issue for the Secretary when making decisions on
land-into-trust applications. Indeed, while IGRA limits a tribe's ability to
conduct gaming on such lands, it does not affect the Secretary's authority to
take land into trust in any way.
2.

Political and Legal Influences in Land-into-Trust

Perhaps ironically, IGRA can be interpreted to gently encourage the
Interior Secretary to take land- into- trust. Prior to IGRA, the Secretary had
the discretion to take land-into-trust.159 In IGRA, Congress characterized
this discretion as a power and also a "responsibility.""16
Prior to the rise of Indian gaming, the Secretary's ability to meet its
"responsibility" to take land into trust was practically limited by rare and
limited federal appropriations for such endeavors. Land-into-trust even
outside the gaming context is sometimes controversial because it shifts
authority away from state and local governments and toward the federal and
tribal governments. As a result of gaming, however, some tribes have
substantial resources of their own to acquire land. If the acquisition is one
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. § 2719(b)(1)(A).
Id.
Id. § 2719(c).
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 § 5, 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006).
25 U.S.C. § 2719(c) (2006).
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that might fall under an exception to the Section 20 prohibition, a tribe may
well have access to investors willing to fund land acquisition in return for a
stake in a gaming venture. Because many land-into-trust applications
require no federal appropriation, the natural limits on such applications have
been raised substantially.
In generally providing that lands taken into trust are not available for
gaming, IGRA seems to have sought to shield such decisions from political
judgments related to gaming. Yet though IGRA has seemingly attempted to
shield land-into-trust applications from additional controversy related to
gaming, expansion of gaming is often controversial. Given that the
Secretary's "responsibility" to acquire land-into-trust for tribes is subject to
such broad discretion, it is nafve to think that the Secretary will ignore
political considerations related to gaming in making such decisions. Since
land-into-trust always requires an exercise of discretion and a positive
action by a federal official, political pressure may well be brought to bear
on that official. Thus, instead of embracing the fact that IGRA sought to
shield Interior from the political ramifications of land-into-trust related to
gaming, Interior has embraced this activity as a political endeavor.
What does this mean? At Interior, the first response to controversy
related to Indian gaming, at least by the politically appointed management,
is to move very slowly. 6' As a result, Interior has moved much more
deliberatively (i.e., slowly) 6 2 with regard to land-into-trust. Interior has

centralized final land-into-trust decisions for gaming in BIA headquarters in
Washington, D.C., and has repeatedly grappled with policy questions on
land-into-trust applications.163
161. For an example in the Indian gaming context, consider the length of time it took
Interior to implement secretarial alternative compacting procedures after the Seminole Tribe
decision in 1996. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Though the procedures
were suggested in May of 1996, closely on the heels of the decision, and the final rule was
adopted less than three years later, see Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,535 (April
12, 1999) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291 (2009)), the Seminole Tribe had to file an action in
March of 2007 to get the Secretary to move on issuing procedures. See Fla. House of
Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008).
162. See, e.g., Indianz.com, Gaming Clouds Already Lengthy Land-into-Trust Process,
Sept. 15, 2005, http://64.38.12.138/News/2005/010327.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (quoting
BIA official George Skibine that "rumors of a moratorium on land-into-trust decisions are
unfounded," but admitting that delays make it look like nothing is happening at Interior).
163. See Acquisition of Title To Land in Trust, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001)
(codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 151 (2009)) (explaining the aborted attempt to adopt formal
regulations on land into trust specifically addressing off-reservation acquisitions for gaming);
see also Memorandum from Carl Artman, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Reg'l
Dirs., Bureau of Indian Affairs, and George Skibine, Office of Indian Gaming, Guidance on
taking off-reservation land into trust for gaming purposes (Jan. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia artman010308.pdf.
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Interior and the NIGC

In IGRA, the NIGC was given the power to regulate gaming on Indian
"' By necessity, as a matter of jurisdiction, the NIGC may proceed
lands. 64
only if it is satisfied that lands are "Indian lands."' 65 One great irony of
Indian gaming regulation-and a source of chagrin to some federal and
state officials-is that the NIGC consistently takes the position that it lacks
authority over any unlawful gaming by Indian tribes that does not occur on
Indian lands.' 66 While this position is probably sound as a matter of legal
interpretation of IGRA, it effectuates a surrender of a key area of significant
regulatory interest to a gaming regulator. The practical ramification is to
leave enforcement of such matters to state and federal enforcement agencies
that may well be less sophisticated about Indian jurisdictional issues. In the
end, the NIGC's position may enhance tribal sovereignty by creating
confusion among unsophisticated actors over who has authority to take
action.
The NIGC's need to determine its own jurisdiction means that making an
"Indian lands determination" is sometimes crucial to performing its work.'67
As a result, it sometimes needs to make a determination quickly as to the
relevant question, namely: Is the gaming facility located on Indian lands?
Because the NIGC's focus is narrow in regard to Indian gaming, because
Interior has a much wider perspective and broader responsibilities as to
Indian affairs, and because the NIGC and Interior should be making
consistent decisions as to what constitutes "Indian lands" for purposes of
gaming, the NIGC has usually sought to work closely with Interior on
making Indian lands determinations.' 68 Nevertheless, the NIGC's need for
timely determinations has occasionally caused frustration when dealing
with slow-moving Interior.
To bring greater deliberation and more resources to bear on Indian lands
determinations, Interior and the NIGC signed a Memorandum of
Understanding in January 2000 that sought to achieve coordination on

164. 25 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(10) (2006).
165. Id. § 2702(3) (noting that a key purpose of IGRA is "the establishment of Federal
standards for gaming on Indian lands").
166. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., EvALUATION
REPORT: THE PROCESS USED TO ASSESS APPLICATIONS TO TAKE LAND INTO TRUST FOR GAMING

PURPOSES 27 (2005), availableat http://www.doioig.gov/upload/2005-G-0030.pdf
167. See generally Oversight Hearing on IGRA Exceptions and Off-Reservation Gaming
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Penny J. Coleman,

Acting General Counsel, National Indian Gaming Commission),
http://www.indian.senate.gov/2005hrgs/072705hrg/coleman.pdf.
168. See infra notes 167-70.

available

at
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Indian lands questions.169 Further memoranda modified the general
agreement.170 When, in 2001, the Tenth Circuit held that Interior lacked the
special authority to interpret the meaning of the term "reservation" in
Section 20 of IGRA, Interior quickly sought and obtained an appropriations
rider from Congress that aimed to clarify that IGRA had indeed delegated
such authority to Interior. 17' Thus, Interior has jealously guarded its
prerogative to make Indian lands determinations in certain contexts.
Despite Interior's efforts to address primary control over some questions
of the scope of the exceptions in Section 20, Interior and the NIGC have
occasionally disagreed as to the Indian land status of a particular tract of
land. In 2008 the NIGC Chairman issued an Indian lands
opinion in which
17 2
question.
the
on
guidance
he refused to wait for Interior
The NIGC has also sought to create a regulatory structure that requires
tribes to consider routinely the status of land on which they intend to
conduct gaming and to provide notice to the NIGC in advance of
commencing gaming on such lands.173 This regulatory strategy seems to
provide a sound and comprehensive approach to addressing questions
regarding Indian lands determinations. It also has the benefit of regularizing
the inquiry, encouraging tribes to address such questions at the outset and to
provide their own analysis, and assuring that the tribal voice is heard loud
and clear.
169. The Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2000 is not available on the NIGC's
current website, but is on file with the author.
170. See Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos v. Kempthome, 492 F.3d 460, 462-63
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing Memorandum of Agreement between the NIGC and the
Department of the Interior dated Feb 26, 2007); see also Miami Tribe of Okla. v. United States,
198 F. App'x 686, 690 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (discussing and quoting Memorandum of
Agreement between National Indian Gaming Commission and Department of the Interior dated
May 31, 2006).
171. Dep't of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-63, §
134, 115 Stat. 414, 442-43 (2001) (Section 134. entitled "Clarification of the Secretary of the
Interior's Authority Under Sections 2701-2721 of Title 25," provides: "The authority to
determine whether a specific area of land is a 'reservation' for purposes of sections 2701-2721
of title 25, United States Code, was delegated to the Secretary of the Interior [in IGRA]."
Though the assertion is unusual, the D.C. Circuit characterized the rider as overturning the
Tenth Circuit's decision and gave the appropriations rider legal effect in Citizens, 492 F.3d at
468.).
172. Letter from Philip N. Hogen, Chairman, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, to Buford L.
Rolin, Tribal Chairman, Poarch Band of Creek Indians (May 19, 2008), available at
http://www.nigc.gov/LinkClick.aspx?link=NIGC+Uploads / 2Findianlands%/o2FPoarch-Final+
Opinion+-+05.19.08.pdf (generally suggesting that the opinion may differ from forthcoming
policies at Interior but concluding that the "decision will not open the [IGRA] to ... far ranging
and unexpected interpretations").
173. Facility License Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 6,019-30 (Feb. 1, 2008) (codified at 25
C.F.R. pts. 502, 552, 559, 573).
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CONCLUSION

Several insights about the federal implementation of IGRA spring from
the foregoing analysis. First, the dispersion of federal Indian gaming
authority across several federal agencies has increased collective action
problems and provided ample opportunity for conflict among the agencies.
Second, the division of authority has presented a modest Chevron17 4
problem in that it is sometimes difficult for federal courts to determine
which agency, if any, is entitled to deference in the interpretation of IGRA.
Third, when the federal government has acted, it has often failed to act with
a clear unified voice. For the most part, the beneficiary of this conflict has
been Indian tribes, which likely are happy to avoid the imposition of federal
authority.
Presuming that regulation has benefits as to the regulated community
(however idealistic this hopeful presumption may be), the conflict between
agencies may well have occasionally harmed tribes. For example, Justice's
aggressive enforcement of its erroneous view on the Johnson Act and
gaming classification matters likely had strong negative ramifications.
Indeed, Justice's persistent, unsuccessful attempts to apply the Johnson Act
to Class II "technological aids" created an atmosphere of legal uncertainty.
This uncertainty may have had significant costs. Despite Justice's
repeated losses in the federal courts of appeal, the threat of federal
prosecution may have discouraged prudent gaming companies from
entering the market for gaming machines. In other words, Justice likely
succeeded in driving out of the market those companies that are most
respectful of the rule of law, leaving the gaming machine market dominated
by a few companies that are willing to operate in a legal "gray area," where
they might face federal prosecution. In sum, the companies with the largest
involvement in such gaming are those that are willing to tread very close to
the thin line separating lawful and unlawful gaming. Because reputable
companies refused to enter the market, Justice's approach thus rewarded
risk-taking companies with extraordinary and quite possibly monopoly-type
profits that would not be available in a market with full and open
competition.
Those profits came at the expense of Indian tribes whose choices of
business partners were thereby constrained by Justice's actions and
threatened actions. In market economic terms, Justice suppressed supply
and created monopoly or oligopoly profits for a few companies, thus
creating a transfer of wealth from tribes to these few gaming machine
174. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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vendors. Since the tribes most affected by Justice's actions were tribes
engaged only in Class II gaming, the effect was particularly severe. It
effectively penalized the poorest gaming tribes and rewarded the risk-taking
companies willing to operate in the shadow of the law. 175 Here, poor
coordination by federal agencies may have undermined IGRA's clear
command to ensure that Indian tribes, and not their outside business
partners, are the primary beneficiaries of Indian gaming.
A second insight is that the NIGC ought to be more willing to take up the
mantle of expert federal agency. In the past, the NIGC has tended to defer to
Justice and to non-expert federal courts on matters well within the NIGC's
expertise. This has resulted in an abdication of responsibility that has
sometimes frustrated even the federal courts. 176 The law gives the NIGC far
more room to exercise authority than it has taken. The agency has been
extremely conservative in key areas. Rather than blindly following court
decisions and swiftly changing its own policies with each succeeding court
opinion, the NIGC should embrace its role as expert and provide the
industry and the courts with a rational approach to Indian gaming
regulation.
Finally, while Indian gaming sometimes raises inherently political
choices, Interior, Justice, and the NIGC have the responsibility to make
decisions deliberately and expeditiously. Where they err, Congress is free to
provide additional guidance. Moreover, a hearing in which a Senate
committee chair or member verbally criticizes an Administration official
may not constitute guidance. While a key part of an official's job is to hear
and respect the concerns of Members of Congress, Congress has the power
to change legal rules to achieve its goals. To some degree, therefore, an
Administration official is wise to exercise discretion and perspective when
Indian gaming questions become the source of political intrigue.
Until Section 5 of the IRA is repealed, Interior has Congressional
marching orders reflecting a delegation of responsibility to Interior to take
land into trust for tribes requesting such action. Section 20 of IGRA
prohibits gaming on some such tracts and allows it on others, but it provides
little discretion to Interior to make decisions on the legal question of
whether an exception applies.
On the subject of land-into-trust, as in many areas of Indian affairs,
federal Indian affairs officials frequently decline to exercise available
authority in favor of Indian tribes. The argument that they often make is as
175. For a more lengthy articulation of this argument, see Oversight Hearing on the
Regulation of Indian Gaming Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 26-29 (2005)
(statement of Kevin K. Washburn, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota).
176. See Diamond Game Enters. v. Reno, 230 F.3d 365 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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follows: If the federal official does what a tribe requests under an existing
law, the action may alienate the public and Congress and result in a change
in the law, causing all tribes to lose the benefit of the law. Because the
premise of the argument is that the federal official knows better than the
tribe what is best for the tribe or the industry, the argument can be described
as paternalistic. That is not to say that this argument is always wrong. One
tribe may not have the interests of all tribes at heart when it makes its
request. However, federal policymakers tend to live in Washington, D.C.,
and thus may have a comparative advantage in understanding how Congress
may react.
In light of the inherent paternalism of this kind of argument, however,
federal officials should wield it carefully. Congress is a very difficult body
to move. Federal officials may well be overly conservative in making such
calculations. Often, the worst sanction that will follow an imprudent
exercise of federal power in favor of a tribe is a tongue-lashing by a
Congressman or Senator. While this may be uncomfortable for the federal
official, fear of such an incident alone is not enough to justify refusing a
tribal request. When it happens, it allows a single member of Congress to
undermine the will of the majority that gave the agency the power at issue.
Where Congress has given an agency a power and a responsibility to benefit
tribes, the agency should seek to avoid being stingy in the exercise of that
power.

